HAMAS and FATAH: Recent Events
From AICbackground
Hamas and Fatah: A Rocky Relationship
Overview
In Palestinian politics there are two main parties: Fatah and Hamas. When Mahmoud Abbas of Fatah designed the 2006 legislative elections, he included both parties. To the surprise of much of the world, Hamas dominated these elections gaining over 56 percent of the parliamentary seats to Fatah’s 34 percent.
Since the election, violence and political struggle have dominated life and politics in Palestine. Fatah and Hamas have gone through repeated cycles of violent clashes and peaceful truces while attempting to govern the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. During the first year of their joint appointment, Fatah and Hamas were unable to form a government. Finally with Saudi mediation, a unity government was formed in February, 2007; however, violence continued, especially in the Gaza Strip. Then in June 2007, after an unusually vicious round of fighting, Hamas took complete control of Gaza. In September of 2007, there exists a divided state with Fatah ruling the West Bank and Hamas ruling the Gaza Strip.
Fatah is a moderate Palestinian Party which supports a two state compromise with Israel. Hamas is a more religiously focused party which does not support the state of Israel and has historically supported violence and terrorist acts. For more information of the distinct entities of Fatah and Hamas, please see their individual pages, as the remainder of the page will focus on their relationship from late 2005 until the present.
Leading-Up to the 2006 Legislative Elections
After becoming president of the Palestinian Legislative Authority, Mahmoud Abbas announced legislative elections, the first in a decade in the Palestinian territories. Outside players, especially Israel, were uneasy with Abbas’ inclusion of Hamas, in the elections. In fact, due to Hamas' participation, Israel at first was not going to allow East Jerusalem residents to vote. Palestinians and outsiders alike, however, believed that Fatah would easily win more seats than Hamas and stay in control of the government. Supporting that belief, in early poling, The Palestinian News Agency WAFA reported on November 20, 2005 that, “39.5 percent [of Palestinians] will vote for Fatah block . . . while 19.9 percent will vote for Hamas block.”
With hindsight it is apparent that signs of Hamas’ strength and Fatah's weaknesses were beginning to show before the election. For instance, Hamas won student elections at the largest University in the West Bank, while young members of Fatah briefly broke away from the party rejecting the corruption of the old guard. Leading-up to the elections the two parties choose very different types of people to list on the ballots. Fatah choose to run many career politicians, who were already known to the Palestinian people as slick and corrupt. Although, Fatah also chose to put the ever popular non-corrupt, Barghuti on its ticket (see the entry on Barghuti, for more information). Hamas, on the other hand, chose “many university teachers, physicians, pharmacists, lawyers, journalists and accountants as its representatives – a move that [was] welcomed by many Palestinians,” according The Jerusalem Post on December 9, 2005.
Furthermore, Fatah was forced at every turn to answer questions about its corruption and its failure to bring lasting peace with Israel, while as the Economist pointed out on Jan 21, 2006 “What ma[de] Hamas’s appeal so great [was] that it d[id] not just rest on its past performance – social programmes, leading the intifada’s violence against Israel, and a reputation for honesty – but on a canny, forward looking campaign . . . It stresse[d] domestic issues: education, welfare, law and order.” Hamas also seemed to keep (before and after the election) the fact that its charter calls for Israel’s destruction, quietly in the background, as not to scare-off more moderate Palestinian voters who were attracted to their slate of candidates, honesty and commitment to domestic programs.
2006 Legislative Elections and Immediate Aftermath
The Palestinian Legislative elections were held on January 25, 2006. The vote was judged legitimate by independent observers such as the National Democratic Institute (http://www.accessdemocracy.org/library/2068_ps_elect_012506.pdf).
Hamas won 44 % of the popular vote and 74 seats, and Fatah won 42% of the popular vote and 45 seats. The Western World, the Middle Eastern Countries, Israel and Fatah all seemed to be shocked at Hamas’ win and its strength within Palestine. However, all of the factors discussed in the previous section contributed to Hamas’ win including and not limited to, Fatah’s past corruption, Hamas’ pick of intellectuals and other non-politicians for their running slate, Hamas’ commitment to social programs, its fight against Israel, and its reputation for honesty.
After the elections, Ismail Haniya for Hamas formed a new government, putting Hamas members in key positions. Subsequently, the Palestinian Authority froze the use of tax money. Furthermore, Israel, The United States, The European Union as well as other Western and Arab states suspended all foreign aid to Palestine. Hamas was in power, though not backed by Fatah and void of any of the aid money that Palestine traditionally depended-upon.
Spring-Summer 2006
The spring and summer of 2006 hosted futile cycles of violent clashes and peaceful truces between Hamas and Fatah, and while Hamas continually called for the formation of a unity government, the two parties were unable to form one. After an unusually tense period, Fatah and Hamas did come together to announce a surprising security plan, which a Fatah spokesman described by saying that "anyone who carries arms will be considered outside the law," reported Agence-France Presse on May 10, 2006. However, only a few days after this dictate, renewed violence lead to both Hamas and Fatah deploying troops to the Gaza strip renewing the vicious cycles of violence and peace.
Also in the spring, in a major political move, Abbas announced that he would hold a referendum on the recognition of Israel based on the boarders of 1967, unless Hamas agreed to these boarders independently. However, the referendum was postponed indefinitely due to Israeli military action against Gaza, according to the Palestinian News Agency on July 15th, 2006. August ended on an optimistic note when Abbass and Haniyeh agreed to talk again about forming a unity government.
The End of 2006
In Palestine, September began with a civil servant strike in Gaza City as well as 2 other Gazan towns. The public workers were striking for their salaries which the Hamas government had been unable to pay without Israeli tax revenues or aid money. With garbage piling up on the streets, its no surprise, that a poll (conducted by Opinion Polls and Survey Studies Cente at Al-Najah University in the West Bank and reported by Agence Press on September 11, 2006) revealed that 84.9 percent of Palestinians supported the formation of a unity government. The basis of such a government would be Hamas' tacit consent of Israel's presence; however, Mahmoud Zahar made clear that, Hamas would "not participate in any government that would recognize Israel", the Chicago Tribune quoted on September 23rd.
Violence between the factions escalated in October and November. Prime Minister Haniyeh responded to the crisis of violence and poverty by announcing that he would step down as Prime Minister if foreign governments would resume their aid to Palestine. President Abbas also at his wits end announced that he would call a new election if a unity government were not formed promptly.
A Meccan Meeting, A Unity Government
2007 began with more violent clashes between Fatah and Hamas. Politically, both sides continued to be frustrated with the lack of lasting peace in Palestine. Outwardly the groups blamed each other. Agence France Presse reported on January 9th that "A spokesman for president Mahmoud Abbas's Fatah party slammed what he called 'a bloody current within Hamas' that was sabotaging efforts to form a government of national unity." However, the repeated breakdowns of ceasefires and truces suggest the political wings of both Fatah and Hamas were unable to control their more radical sides.
With continued violence and internal strife in Palestine, outside Arab powers showed their concern by bringing Fatah and Hamas together. The Egyptians mediated yet another truce, while Saudi Arabia used its power and prestige in the region to bring the two groups together for serious talks on forming a united government. The Saudi talks were at last successful, and after over a year of infighting, Hamas and Fatah reached an agreement on a unified government.
The New Straights Times in Malaysia (on February 11, 2007) described the excitement of the Palestinians, "Guns that had been trained on each other only days before were fired in the air as jubilation took over the streets of Gaza at the news on Thursday that a deal had been struck in Mecca . . . After two months of fraternal feuding which left more than 90 dead, ordinary Palestinians were sick and tired, as if the withdrawal of international aid on top of the Israeli occupation and embargo were not bad enough." The rest of the world reacted to the news more cautiously, curious as to how the political deal would affect the action seen on the ground.
While the news of the new government seemed to quell most violence for a few weeks, clashes began again setting a violent backdrop for the governmental transition. On March 17th, the unity government was approved in parliament and officially took its place. The new government, despite its two-sided representation, was still unable to squelch the violence. May ended with a fleeting ceasefire, put into place after 50 people died in clashes in just one day.
A Divided Palestine (June 2007 - September 2007)
In June, violence between Fatah and Hamas escalated dramatically, especially in Gaza. After Hamas took over several major security posts, Abbas declared a state of emergency and dissolved the unity government. The next day he appointed Salam Fayyad to head an emergency government, without any Hamas members. Haniya responded that there was no need to dismiss the government and that nothing unusual was happening in Gaza. He said "The Hamas presence in the Government is the decision of the Palestinian people [and] unilateral decisions, made without the cooperation or coordination, do not suit the current situation. Therefore, the present Government will continue operating and will not give up its position and responsibility towards the Palestinian people," according to the Weekend Australian on June 16th, 2007. Despite Haniya's claims of normalcy, The Gaza Strip was inundated with looting and violence and it soon was clear that Hamas forces had actually pushed Fatah forces out of Gaza. And while Hamas promptly called for talks between the now estranged parties, Fatah scoffed at the suggestion.
With Hamas in control of one piece of Palestine and Fatah in control of another, foreign governments were able to now deal with Fatah alone. Israel handed frozen tax revenues, nearly $50 million, to Abbas, and resumed peace talks with Fatah. The West resumed giving aid money to Fatah, now separated from a 'terrorist' organization. At the same time support and international trade remained elusive to citizens of the Gaza strip. The outside players were supporting the more moderate faction in Palestinian politics as well as specifically not helping the more radical wing. Hamas tried to get the attention of western players by brokering the release of Alan Johnston, a foreign journalist, but while his successful release was lauded, western players were no more interested in supporting Hamas than they were before.
Despite both having there small pieces of land which they control, both Fatah and Hamas wanted and still want to reunite Palestine. With this thinking, on July 7, 2007 Menas News Agency of Cairo reported that Fatah had "set its conditions to restart dialog with Hamas. The conditions include Hamas's handing over ministries, institutions and documents to the legitimate Palestinian government and returning matters to pre-coup conditions in the Gaza strip." At the same time, Hamas announced its desire for talks with Fatah. Despite the two parties outwardly declaring their desire for talks, no immediate dialogue took place.
As July preceded, violence seemed to diminish, but tensions remained high and Israel entered more directly into the inter-Palestinian conflict. Israel offered clemency to 178 Fatah militiamen, if they were to turn in their weapons and "join the regular Palestinian security forces and turn full attention to disarming the rival Hamas movement," reported the Los Angeles Times on July 16th, 2007. Israel also released 225 prisoners, mostly members of Fatah to support the government of Abbas. Israel has great reason to support Fatah over Hamas, whose charter calls for its destruction. As Fatah and the West Bank gain more and more help and support from the international community, the disparities between it and the Gaza Strip will become ever more apparent. Already, Gazans are facing huge obstacles without aid money or international trade available to them. It will be interesting to see how the outside world, Hamas and the Palestinian people will all respond to the situation.
There are still huge rifts between the Fatah and Hamas parties. They differ on issues as divergent as whether the weekend should be Thursday-Friday or Friday-Saturday, and whether to recognize Israel. Despite small amounts of violence, such as the clash that erupted after Fatah supporters in Gaza prayed outside of the mosque in a motion of dissent, overall the New York Times reported on September 8th, 2007 that "Nearly three months after Hamas conquered the teeming streets of Gaza, a wary calm has taken hold. People stroll at all hours, car theft has practically stopped, even armed police officers are rarely seen." While the calm is welcomed, it is not a sign of political unity. Hamas leaders however continue to call for talks with rival Fatah, though ignoring the pre-conditions that its rival set out. Hamas and Fatah appear to be even farther apart than before the Saudi-brokered talks in February.
Selected Resources On most websites, you will not be able to access for free the articles that I used; however, please use these websites to stay up to date on current developments, or ask a librarian how to obtain older articles.
MENA News Agency Cairo http://www.mena.org.eg/index.aspx
Palestinian News Agency WAFA http://www.wafa.ps/english/
Turkish Daily News http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/
Jerusalem Post http://www.jpost.com/
Agence France Presse http://www.afp.com/english/home/
Deutsche Press Agentur (non-english) http://www.presseportal.de/
The Economist http://www.economist.com/index.html
New York Times http://www.nytimes.com/
The Financial Times http://www.ft.com/home/us
